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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
FILE WRAPPER ESTOPPEL
0. M. CHISTENSEN*
Patent law cases are rare in Washington. Thys v. R%vard,1 the most
recent, concerned patent infringement and turned on two important
rules of patent law- the doctrine of equivalents and the doctrine of file
wrapper estoppel. Although the former of these rules had confronted
the court on an earlier occasion,2 file wrapper estoppel was presented
for the first time by the Rivard case.
File wrapper estoppel, a rule of patent construction," derives its
name from the Patent Office file wrapper containing the record of pro-
ceedings leading up to the grant of the letters patent. If, when the
Patent Office examines the application for patent, it is found in the
light of the prior art in the field that the applicant has drawn his
claims too broadly for his actual invention they will be rejected. Should
the rejection be made final, two alternatives are open to the applicant:
appeal to the federal courts or amend the claims to meet the grounds
of rejection. If the latter course is followed and the claims are nar-
rowed to avoid conflict with the prior art cited against them, the appli-
cant's rights under the resulting patent are limited by file wrapper
estoppel. That is, a court construing the patent will not extend its
claims to the point where they become equal to or greater than those
originally in the application. The theory is that the patentee is estopped
from asserting an interpretation of his patent claims so broad as to
recapture subject matter once cancelled from the application in order
to secure allowance of the patent.'
While file wrapper estoppel, in its foregoing aspect, operates to
restrict, the doctrine of equivalents permits a court to extend, the cov-
erage of a patent.' This doctrine is normally applied in the case of
clearly meritorious inventions, to give full or maximum effect to the
patent. Under this rule the patentee is entitled to the exclusive right
to make, use and sell not only the thing particularly specified in the
patent claims but all reasonable equivalents thereof as well. The policy
• Registered Patent Agent, Seattle, Wash.
1129 Wash. Dec. 469. 189 P.(2d) 952 (1947).
2 Osgood Panel and Veneer Co. v. Osgood, 166 Wash. 315, 6 P.(2d)661 (1932).
8 Schriber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 311 U.S. 211 (1940), Shepard v.
Carrigan, 116 U.S. 593 (1885) , Sutter v. Robinson, 119 U.S. 530 (1886), Roemer v.
Peddie, 132 U.S. 313 (1889), Phoenix Caster Co. v. Spiegel, 133 U.S. 360 (1889),
Hubbell v. U.S., 179 U.S. 77 (1900), Weber Electric Co. v. Freeman, 256 U.S. 668
(1920), LT.S. Rubber Co. v. Essex Rubber Co., 272 U.S. 426 (1926).
4 The Texas Company v. Anderson-Prichard Refining Co., 122 F. (2d) 829, 50
U.S.P.Q. 600 (C.C.A. 10th, 1941).
5 Osgood Panel and Veneer Co. v. Osgood, supra, note 2.
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of the doctrine of equivalents is in keeping with the promotional spirit
of the constitutional provision."
Despite its virtue, the doctrine of equivalents should be applied
cautiously 7 While inventors should be fully protected in their patent
rights, certainty in the meaning of patents is of equal if not greater
importance to the public. Fear of infringing patents deceivingly re-
stricted by the usual standards of construction, yet subject to the
expansive doctrines of equivalents unreasonably applied would dis-
courage other inventors and industry alike from making new advances.
Recognizing tins problem, courts generally reject the doctrine of
equivalents entirely in cases where the countervailing rule, file wrapper
estoppel, is found applicable." "The injurious consequences to the pub-
lic and to inventors and patent applicants if patentees were thus per-
mitted to revive cancelled or rejected claims and restore them to their
patents are manifest."'
In the instant case,1" the appellants' right to recovery lay primarily
in contract. This right in turn depended upon proof that respondents'
hop-picking machine infringed appellants' patent. Appellants relied on
the doctrine of equivalents, while respondents denied infringement
and introduced in evidence the file wrapper of appellants' patent to
prove file wrapper estoppel. On the second appeal, relying upon the
doctrine of equivalents the court reversed, stating that the defense of
file wrapper estoppel, although a complete defense to patent infringe-
ment, is an affirmative defense and, as a result, must be pleaded spe-
cially, which respondents did not do. No reference was made in the
opinion of appellants' failure to plead the doctrine of equivalents.
Citing no authority for its holding, the court proceeded contrary to
the usual rule, that file wrapper estoppel is inherently part of the very
question of infringement and is not an affirmative defense to infringe-
ment.1 On the question of pleading, while the federal courts require
6 Art I, § 8. "The Congress shall have power to promote the progress of
science and useful arts, by securing to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their
respective writings and discoveries."
7Osgood Panel and Veneer Co. v. Osgood, supra, note 2.
8 Schriber-Schroth v. Cleveland Trust Co., supra, note 3, Exhibit Supply Co. v.
Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126 (1942), Smith v. Magic City Club, 282 U.S. 784
(1930) , Weber Electric Co. v. Freeman, supra, note 3.9 Schriber-Schroth v. Cleveland Trust Co., supra, note 3.
10 Thys v. Rivard, rupra, note 1.
11Kuester v. Hoffman, 152 F. (2d) 318 (C.C.A? 7th 1935), Thomas v. Simmons
Company, 126 F. (2d) 743, 53 U.S.P.Q. 88 (C.C.A. 7th 1945), Oldfield v. Nunn Brass
Works, 42 F Supp. 262 (W.D.N.Y. 1941), Kohloff v. Ford Motor Co., 37 F Supp.
462, 48 U.S.P.Q. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1941), Research Products Co. Ltd. v. The Treolite
Co., 66 F.(2d) 530, 43 U.S.P.Q. 99 (C.C.A. 9th 1939).
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pleading or notice of the grounds relied on in attacking the validity of
patents, it has not been supposed that such a requirement extends to
matters of patent construction."2 This writer has discovered no case
supporting the Rivard decision.
Understanding the R~vard case is made still more difficult because
the holding excuses one party from pleading a rule of patent construc-
tion, while requiring the opposite party to plead the countervailing
rule. 8 This places the second party in the difficult position of being
forced to prophesy at the pleading stage what evidence will be intro-
duced by the other party at the trial stage.
It is not surprising that this result was reached by a court mexperl-
enced in the law of patents, because "file wrapper estoppel" is a Ims-
nomer. It lacks one of the essential elements of a true estoppel, vwz., a
r~gkt possessed by one who is precluded from asserting it because of
prior conduct inconsistent therewith. In a suit for patent infringement
the issue is one of scope of the patent grant. Where file wrapper estop-
pel operates against the patentee the alleged patent right, to that extent,
is simply nonexistent. In such a case, invoking an estoppel as such
against the patentee is unnecessary to bar recovery
12 Zip Mfg. Co. v. Pusch, 2 F.t2d) 828 (C.C.A. 8th 1924), Benze v. Celeste, 136
F.(2d) 845 (C.C.A. 2d 1943).Is The court denied respondents' petition for rehearing based upon this ground.
The argument that file wrapper estoppel is not like true estoppel and is not by nature
an affirmative defense was likewise rejected.
